Sponge Examples: Energy-Latency Attacks on Neural Networks by Shumailov, Ilia et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
03
46
3v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  5
 Ju
n 2
02
0
Sponge Examples: Energy-Latency Attacks
on Neural Networks
Ilia Shumailov*
University of Cambridge
ilia.shumailov@cl.cam.ac.uk
Yiren Zhao*
University of Cambridge
yiren.zhao@cl.cam.ac.uk
Daniel Bates
University of Cambridge
daniel.bates@cl.cam.ac.uk
Nicolas Papernot
University of Toronto and Vector Institute
nicolas.papernot@utoronto.ca
Robert Mullins
University of Cambridge
robert.mullins@cl.cam.ac.uk
Ross Anderson
University of Cambridge
ross.anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk
Abstract
The high energy costs of neural network training and inference led to the use of ac-
celeration hardware such as GPUs and TPUs. While this enabled us to train large-
scale neural networks in datacenters and deploy them on edge devices, the focus
so far is on average-case performance. In this work, we introduce a novel threat
vector against neural networks whose energy consumption or decision latency are
critical. We show how adversaries can exploit carefully crafted sponge examples,
which are inputs designed to maximise energy consumption and latency.
We mount two variants of this attack on established vision and language models,
increasing energy consumption by a factor of 10 to 200. Our attacks can also
be used to delay decisions where a network has critical real-time performance,
such as in perception for autonomous vehicles. We demonstrate the portability
of our malicious inputs across CPUs and a variety of hardware accelerator chips
including GPUs, and an ASIC simulator. We conclude by proposing a defense
strategy which mitigates our attack by shifting the analysis of energy consumption
in hardware from an average-case to a worst-case perspective.
1 Introduction
The wide adoption of machine learning has motivated serious study of its security vulnerabilities.
Threat vectors such as adversarial examples [1, 2], data poisoning [3, 4], and membership inference
attacks [5, 6] have been extensively explored. These attacks either target the confidentiality or in-
tegrity of machine learning systems [7, 8]. So what about the third leg of the security triad, their
availability? In this paper, we introduce an attack that increases the power drawn by neural networks
and the time they take to make decisions. Increased energy consumption on edge devices that are
battery-powered (such as smartphones or IoT devices) can make them unavailable [9]. Perhaps even
more seriously, an attack that can slow down decisions can subvert safety-critical or mission-critical
systems.
Our key observation is that different inputs of the same size can cause a deep neural network (DNN)
to draw very different amounts of time and energy: this energy-latency gap is the vulnerability we
exploit.
Preprint. Under review.
Our attack can be even more effective against the growing number of systems that use GPUs or
custom hardware. Machine learning in general, and deep learning in particular, command workloads
heavy in matrix algebra. GPUs were fundamental to the AlexNet breakthrough in 2012 [10]; in
response to increasing demand, Google introduced TPUs to facilitate inference – and training –
in its datacenters [11]; while Apple introduced the Neural Engine to make its smartphones more
energy-efficient for on-device deep learning [12].
Our first attack uses a genetic algorithm to craft malicious inputs, which we call sponge examples,
designed to soak up energy from a neural network. Time measurements obtained by profiling mu-
tated inputs serve as the fitness function needed for the genetic algorithm to evolve better sponge
examples. Our second, enhanced, attack instead optimizes sponge examples with L-BFGS and a
loss that encourages the optimizer to return inputs with large activation norms across all hidden lay-
ers of a neural network. We find that this second attack is even more effective at maximizing energy
consumption during inference1. Quite apart from battery-draining attacks, sponge examples could
cause a control system to fail to meet real-time service requirements. To give but two examples,
autonomous vehicle designers should consider whether they could cause accidents, while engineers
building neural networks into cognitive radar should analyse whether they create a new opportunity
for jamming.
Our contributions are the following:
• We formulate a novel energy-based threat against the availability of ML systems. We
instantiate a corresponding threat vector, sponge examples, with two attacks designed to
cause the worst possible energy consumption during inference.
• Our evaluation shows that canonical models for both vision and language tasks are vulnera-
ble to sponge examples, including models specifically compressed to be deployed on edge
devices (e.g., MobileNet). Our genetic algorithm attack increases energy consumption by
natural language tasks up to 200×, latency by up to 70× and our enhanced L-BFGS-B
attack increases computer vision task consumption by up to 8%.
• We demonstrate the portability of the threat vector instantiated by sponge examples, given
that our conclusions are consistent across a variety of chips: CPUs, GPUs, and an ASIC
simulator. Sponge examples also transfer across model architectures.
• We present a simple defense against sponge examples that can also prevent unexpected
increases in the energy consumption of ML systems in the absence of adversaries, with
direct beneficial consequences for the carbon footprint of models deployed for inference at
scale (e.g., machine translation on smartphones), as well as for the worst-case performance
of such models.
2 Background on Hardware Acceleration for Deep Learning
Workloads generated by inference for deep neural networks (DNNs) are intensive in both compute
and memory. Common hardware products such as CPUs and GPUs are now being adapted to this
workload, and provide features dedicated to accelerating DNN inference. Intel’s Knights Mill CPU
provides a set of SIMD instructions [13], while NVIDIA’s Volta GPU introduces Tensor Cores to
facilitate the low-precision multiplications that underpin much of deep learning [14].
Hardware dedicated to deep learning is now pervasive in data centers, with examples including Big
Basin at Facebook [15], BrainWave at Microsoft [16], and racks of TPUs at Google [11, 17]; the
underlying hardware on these systems are either commodity hardware (Big Basin), reconfigurable
hardware (FPGAs for BrainWave), or custom silicon (TPUs). The latter two are specifically de-
signed to improve the number of Operations per Watt (OPs/W) of DNN inference. As we discuss
later, custom and semi-custom hardware often exploit sparsity in data and the adequacy of low-
precision computations to train neural networks, reducing both arithmetic complexity and DRAM
accesses, and thus achieving significantly better power efficiency [18, 19]. Our attack undermines
the benefits brought by such hardware.
1Technically, we might describe this process as pessimization rather than optimization, as we’re finding the
inputs that give the worst possible performance.
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Performance per watt is an important indicator for the efficiency of cloud infrastructure [20]. Power
oversubscription is a popular method for cloud services to handle provisioning. However, this makes
data centers vulnerable to power attacks [21, 22, 23, 24]. If malicious users can remotely generate
power spikes on multiple hosts in the data center at the same time, they might overload the sys-
tem and cause disruption of service [21, 25]. Energy attacks against mobile devices aim to drain
the battery more quickly [9, 26]. The possible victims of energy attacks on mobile systems range
from phones to more constrained sensors [27]. Higher energy consumption also increases hardware
temperature, which in turn increases the failure rate. For example, Anderson et al. note that an in-
crease of 15◦C causes component failure rates to double [28]. Modern hardware throttles to avoid
over-heating; but throttling causes tasks to consume more energy as now they take longer to run,
increasing total static and dynamic power costs.
3 Methodology
3.1 Adversary Model
In this paper we assume an adversary with the ability to supply an input sample to a target system,
which then processes the sample using a single CPU, GPU or ASIC. We assume no rate limiting,
apart from on-device dynamic power control or thermal throttling.We assume no physical access to
the systems i.e. an attacker cannot reprogram the hardware or change the configuration.
We consider our attack in three threat models. The first threat model is awhite-box setup: we assume
the attackers know the model architecture and parameters. The second threat model considers an
interactive black-box: we assume attackers have no knowledge of the architecture and parameters,
but are able to time the operations or measure energy consumption remotely and can query the
target as many times as they want. The third threat model is the one of a blind adversary, where no
knowledge of the target architecture and parameters is assumed and attackers cannot take any direct
measurements. In this setting, the adversary has to resort to a direct transfer of sponge examples
found previously to a new target model – without prior interaction.
A simple example of a target system could be a dialogue system. Users interact continuously by
sending queries and can measure energy consumption, or when that is not possible have a timing
side channel by measuring the response time (see Section 4).
3.2 The Energy Gap
We tested three hardware platforms: CPU, GPU and an ASIC simulator. The amount of energy
consumed by one inference pass (i.e. a forward pass in a neural network) depends primarily on:
• The overall number of arithmetic operations required to process the inputs;
• The number of memory accesses e.g. to the GPU DRAM.
The intriguing question now is:
Is there a significant gap in energy consumption for different model inputs of the same dimension?
As well as fixing the dimension of inputs, we also do not consider inputs that would exceed the pre-
defined numerical range of each dimension. If models do have a large energy gap between different
inputs, we describe two hypotheses that we think attackers can exploit to create sponge examples,
that is, inputs with abnormally high energy consumption.
3.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Data Sparsity
The rectified linear unit (ReLU), which computes x 7→ max(0, x), is the de facto choice of activation
function in neural network architectures. This design introduces sparsity in the activations of hidden
layers when the weighted sum of inputs to a neuron is negative. A large number of ASIC neural
network accelerators consequently exploit runtime data sparsity to increase efficiency. For instance,
ASIC accelerators may employ zero-skipping multiplications or encode DRAM traffic to reduce the
off-chip bandwidth requirement. Hence, inputs that lead to less sparse activations will increase the
number of operations and the number of memory accesses, and thus energy consumption.
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3.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Computation Dimensions
Aside from data sparsity, modern networks also have a computational dimension. Along with vari-
able input and output shapes, the internal representation size often changes as well – for example,
in the Transformer-based architectures for machine translation [29]. In this case, both the input and
output are sequences of words and internal representation depends on both of them. Each word is
represented as a number of tokens, whose shape depends on the richness of input and output dictio-
naries. As computation progresses, internally each inference step depends on all of the inputs and
outputs so far.
Consider an input sequence x and an output sequence y. We denote the input and output token sizes
(i.e. the number of unique words) with ltin and ltout. Each of the words in a sequence is embedded
in a space of dimensionality lein, for the input, and leout, for the output. Algorithm 1 contains the
pseudocode for a Transformer’s principal steps. In red, we annotate the computational complexity
of the following instruction. As can be seen, several quantities can be manipulated by an adversary
to increase the algorithm’s run time: 1) token size of the input sentence ltin; 2) token size of the
output sentence ltout; and 3) size of the input and output embedding spaces (lein and leout). All
of the above can cause a non-linear increase in algorithmic complexity and thus heavily increase
the amount of energy consumed. Importantly, perturbing these quantities does not require that the
adversary modify the dimension of input sequence x; so with no changes to the input dimensionality,
the adversary is able to increase energy consumption non-linearly.
Algorithm 1: Translation Transformer NLP pipeline
Result: y
1 ↓ O(ltin)
2 xtin = Tokenize(x);
3 ytouts = ∅;
4 ↓ O(lein)
5 xein = Encode (xtin);
6 ↓ O(ltin × lein × ltout × leout)
7 while ytout has no end of sentence token do
8 ↓ O(leout)
9 yeout = Encode (ytout);
10 ↓ O(lein × leout)
11 yeout = model.Inference(xein, yeout, ytouts);
12 ↓ O(leout);
13 ytout = Decode(yeout);
14 ytouts.add(ytout);
15 end
16 ↓ O(ltout);
17 y = Detokenize(ytouts)
3.3 Latency and Energy Attacks on Neural Networks
Having presented the intuition behind our attacks, we now introduce three strategies for finding
sponge examples, corresponding to the threat models described in Section 3.1.
3.3.1 Finding Sponge Examples with Genetic Algorithms in White and Black-box Settings
Genetic algorithms (GA) are a powerful tool for adversaries [30]. They can optimise a diverse set of
objectives, require no local gradient information. They are a particularly good fit for adversaries who
only have access to the model’s prediction in a black-box setting. We start with a pool of randomly
generated samples S. These are images for computer vision models, or sentences for NLP tasks. We
then iteratively evolve the population pool:
• For computer vision tasks, we sample two parents A and B from the population pool, and
crossover the inputs using a random mask A ∗mask+ (1 −mask) ∗B.
4
• For NLP tasks, we sample two parents A and B, and crossover by concatenating the left
part of parent A with the right part of parent B. We then probabilistically invert the two
parts.
We explain the reasons for these choices in Appendix D. Next, we randomly mutate (i.e. randomly
perturb) a proportion of the input features (i.e. pixels in vision, words in NLP) of the children.
To maintain enough diversity in the pool, we preserve the best per-class samples in the pool. We
obtain a fitness score P for all pool members, namely their energy consumption. We then select the
winning top 10% samples Sˆ,2 and use them as parents for the next iteration. This genetic algorithm
is simple but effective in finding sponge examples.
3.3.2 Sponge Examples in the White-box Setting
We now consider an adversary with access to the model’s parameters. Rather than a genetic algo-
rithm, we use L-BFGS-B [31] to optimise the following objective:
−
∑
al∈A
‖al‖2 (1)
where A is the set of all activation values and al the activations of layer l. This generates inputs that
increase activation values of the model across all of the layers simultaneously. Following Hypothesis
1 outlined above, the decrease in density prevents hardware from skipping some of the operations
which in turn increases energy consumption. We only evaluate the performance of sponge examples
found by L-BFGS-B on computer vision tasks because of the discrete nature of the NLP tasks.
3.4 Cross-model and Cross-hardware Transferability for Blind Adversaries
When adversaries are unable to query the model, they cannot directly solve an optimisation problem
to find sponge examples, even using interactive black-box approach i.e.run the GA. In this blind
adversary setting, we exploit transferability across both models and hardware. Indeed, in Section 4.5
and Appendix F, we show that sponge examples transfer across models. We examine three hardware
platforms in our evaluation:
• CPU: The platform is an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 with 2.10GHz clock frequency.
We use the Running Average Power Limit (RAPL) to measure energy consumption of the
CPU. RAPL has been thoroughly evaluated and found to reflect actual energy consumption,
as long as the counters are not sampled too quickly [32, 33].
• GPU:We use a GeForce 1080 Ti GPU with a 250.0 Watts power limit, a 96◦C slowdown
temperature and a 84◦C throttling temperature. We use the NVIDIA Management Library
(NVML) to measure energy consumption. NVML was previously found to capture en-
ergy quite accurately, with occasional instability for high-low patterns and high sampling
rates [34].
• ASIC: We also developed a deterministic ASIC simulator, which monitors and records
the runtime operations and number of DRAM accesses assuming a conservative memory
flushing strategy. We then use measurements by Horowitz to approximate energy con-
sumption [35]: at 45nm technology and 0.9V, we assume 1950 pJ to access a 32 bit value
in DRAM and 3.7 pJ for a floating-point multiplication.
We show in Section 4.5 that sponge examples transfer across these types of hardware.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Experimental Setup
NLP tasks. We first evaluate our sponge example attack on a range of NLP models provided by
the FairSeq framework [36]. The models we consider have achieved top performance at their respec-
tive tasks. We report performance of the RoBERTa [37] model, an optimised BERT [38], on three
2As the sample pool is large, selecting the top 10% makes the process more tractable.
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GLUE benchmarks [39]. The datasets we considered include tasks in the SuperGLUE benchmark
plus a number of machine-translation tasks. The SuperGLUE benchmark follows the style of GLUE
but includes a wider range of language-understanding tasks including question answering and con-
ference resolution [39, 40]. Further, we evaluate the attack on a number of translation tasks (WMT)
using Transformer-based models [41, 42, 43].
Consider the pipeline for handling text. Before getting to the models, text goes through several pre-
possessing steps. First, words get tokenized in a manner meaningful for the language. We used the
tokenizer from the Moses toolkit[44], which separates punctuation from words and normalises char-
acters. Next, tokenized blocks get encoded. Until recently, unknown words were simply replaced
with an unknown token. Modern encoders improve performance by exploiting the idea that many
words are a combination of other words. BPE is a popular approach that breaks unknown words
into subwords it knows and uses those as individual tokens [45]. In that way, known sentences get
encoded very efficiently, mapping every word to a token. (Unknown words lead to a much larger
sentence representation.)
Vision tasks. We evaluate the sponge example attack on a range of vision models provided in
the TorchVision library. We show the performance of ResNet-18, ResNet-50 and ResNet-101 [46],
DenseNet-121, DenseNet-161, DenseNet-201 [47], GoogleNet [48] and MobileNet-V2 [49]. All of
the networks solve a canonical computer vision classification task – ImageNet-2017.
4.2 White-box Sponge Examples against NLP tasks
Input size NVMLgpu Naturalasic Randomasic Sponge Meanasic Sponge Top 10%asic Energygpu Timegpu
Language Understanding: SuperGLUE Benchmark with [37]
CoLA
15 5829.32 4.30 69.72 83.92 87.11 ×20.25 ×1.23
30 9388.40 4.30 138.07 164.07 169.91 ×39.51 ×1.48
100 22698.87 4.30 452.49 518.19 530.80 ×123.42 ×3.82
MNLI
15 6126.65 12.88 73.47 86.97 89.96 ×6.98 ×1.32
30 9631.68 17.66 142.63 168.96 174.34 ×9.87 ×2.03
100 22952.14 34.47 456.11 518.89 531.40 ×15.42 ×3.16
WSC
15 27876.53 14.48 523.28 1300.19 2152.67 ×148.62 ×9.83
30 82822.58 34.94 1882.63 3927.63 5348.06 ×153.08 ×19.25
100 662811.96 194.89 16754.13 25367.30 30692.95 ×157.49 ×69.83
Machine Translation: WMT14/16 with [41]
En→Fr
30 59597.32 31.87 109.80 118.47 141.27 ×4.43 ×4.45
50 93731.34 48.54 166.13 249.89 569.85 ×11.74 ×13.51
En→De 15 18133.66 18.19 35.80 242.39 542.35 ×29.82 ×32.86
Table 1: Energy is reported in millijoules. GA was ran for 100 epochs with a pool size of 100.
We report GPU energy readings using NVML and show the amount of energy and time increase
as Energygpu and Timegpu respectively. In addition, we show the performance of samples from
the evaluation dataset (Naturalasic), random noise (Randomasic) and sponge example performance
on the accelerator simulator. For sponge examples, we average the final GA pool samples and
report it as Sponge Meanasic; in addition, the top 10% sponge examples are averaged and reported
as Sponge Top 10%asic. More results are available in Appendix.
Table 1 shows the energy consumption of different models in the presence of an energy-latency ad-
versary. For all models examined in Table 1, we found effective sponge examples that increased
energy consumption considerably. In the best-case scenario, we were able to slow down the task
evaluation by a factor of 70 and increase its energy consumption by a factor of 197. The main rea-
son for performance degradation was increased computation dimension, as described in Algorithm
1. First, for a given input sequence size, the attack maximises the size of the post-tokenisation rep-
resentation (xtin), exploiting the tokeniser and sub-word processing. Second, the attack learns to
maximise output sequence length, since this links directly to the computation cost. Third, internal
computation coupled with the output sequence length and post-tokenisation length give a quadratic
increase in energy consumption. An interesting observation is that Naturalasic text consumes a lot
less energy in comparison to Randomasic and Sponge Meanasic texts. This can be attributed to the
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fact that natural samples are efficiently encoded, whereas random and attack samples produce an un-
necessarily long representation, meaning random noise can be used as a scalable black-box latency
and energy attacker.
4.3 White-box Sponge Examples against CV Tasks
According to the hypotheses in Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2, we can increase energy consumption
by increasing either computation dimension or data density. Although theoretically we can provide
larger images to increase the computation dimension for computer vision networks, very fewmodern
networks currently deal with dynamic input or output. Usually preprocessing normalizes variable-
sized images to a pre-defined size by either cropping or scaling. Therefore, for computer vision
models, we focus on increasing the energy and latency via data density. We calculate the theoretical
upper bounds of data density using Interval Bound Propagation (IBP) [50]. Although originally
developed for certifiable robustness, we adopt the technique to look at internal network bounds that
only take 0 for the whole natural image range3.
Timegpu [s] Costasic [mJ] Costasic ratio post-ReLU Density Density Max Density
ResNet-50
L-BFGS-B Sponge 0.011 164.727 0.863 0.619 0.885
0.998
Sponge 0.016 160.887 0.843 0.562 0.868
Natural 0.017 160.562 0.842 0.572 0.867
Random 0.017 155.820 0.817 0.483 0.845
DenseNet-121
L-BFGS-B Sponge 0.033 152.595 0.783 0.571 0.826
0.829Sponge 0.029 149.564 0.767 0.540 0.814
Natural 0.033 147.227 0.755 0.523 0.804
Random 0.030 144.365 0.741 0.487 0.792
MobileNet v2
L-BFGS-B Sponge 0.011 87.511 0.844 0.692 0.890
0.996Sponge 0.010 84.513 0.815 0.645 0.868
Natural 0.011 85.075 0.821 0.646 0.873
Random 0.011 80.805 0.779 0.567 0.844
Table 2: Energy is reported in milli joules. GA was ran for 100 epochs with a pool size of 100. More
results are available in Appendix.
Table 2 presents the performance of sponge example attacks on selected CVmodels; we show results
for all of them in Appendix C. As shown in Timegpu, the inference pass of CV models uses a lot less
time and the maximum energy consumption is a lot lower. Since the energy consumption is lower
per inference, it is challenging to get a true measurement of energy given the interference from
the GPU’s hardware temperature control, and that energy inspection tools lack the resolution. We
attempt to statistically measure consumption in Appendix E. In Table 2, we focused on the results of
GA maximising the ASIC simulator cost. Costasic shows the energy estimated from the accelerator
simulator; density is the ratio between the number of non-zero values and total values, post-ReLU
Density only considers the values after the ReLU non-linearity, and ‘Costasic ratio’ refers to the cost
on the ASIC with optimisations compared to the cost on an ASIC without any optimisations. In this
case, we consider ASIC-level optimisations of zero-skipping multiplications [51] and compressed
DRAM accesses [52]. ‘Max density’ refers to the largest possible density obtained through IBP.
The results for density and energy suggest that both attacks successfully generate sponge examples
that are marginally more expensive in terms of energy. To be precise, we were able to get a 1 −
3% increase in energy consumption when compared to natural samples. To better understand the
difference in performance please refer to Appendix H. Finally, we observe that sponge examples are
transferable and can be used to launch a blind black-box attack. See Appendix F for details.
4.4 Interactive Black-box Sponge Examples against NLP Tasks
In this section we show the performance of the attack run in an interactive black-box manner against
NLP tasks. We compare the sponge examples found by our attacks based on 1) time; 2) energy; and
3) ASIC cost. The last is a white-box baseline, whilst the first two are interactive black-box attacks.
This means we use whether time, energy or ASIC cost as a fitness scoring for the GA. Figure 1 shows
3Note that we assume full floating point precision here. In practice, emerging hardware often uses much
lower quantisation which will result in a lower maximum data density.
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Figure 1: Performance of Sponge Examples based on the Energy, Time and Simulator fitness costs.
From To Costasic [mJ] Timegpu [s] NVMLgpu [mJ] Timecpu [s] RAPLcpu[mJ]
Black-box
WMT16en→de [41]
WMT14en→fr [41]
Sponge 3648.219 0.174 17251.000 1.048 51512.966
Natural 1450.403 0.053 6146.550 0.537 23610.145
×2.52 ×3.27 ×2.81 ×1.95 ×2.18
WMT18en→de [42]
Sponge 2909.245 0.414 47723.500 3.199 181936.595
Natural 1507.364 0.253 27265.250 1.344 71714.201
×1.93 ×1.64 ×1.75 ×2.38 ×2.54
WMT19en→ru [43]
Sponge 3875.365 0.652 67183.100 4.409 247585.091
Natural 1654.965 0.215 25033.620 2.193 121210.376
×2.34 ×3.03 ×2.68 ×2.01 ×2.04
White-box
WMT16en→de [41] WMT16en→de [41]
Sponge 48447.093 2.414 260187.900 13.615 781758.680
Natural 1360.118 0.056 6355.620 0.520 23262.311
×35.62 ×42.98 ×40.94 ×26.20 ×33.61
Table 3: Energy values are reported in milli Joules and time is reported in seconds. GA was ran for
100 epochs with a pool size of 1000. More results are available in Appendix.
sponge example performance against a WMT14 English-to-French Transformer-based translator
with an input of size 15 and pool size of 100. It can be seen that, although both Energy and Time
attackers run without any knowledge of network internals, they successfully increase the energy and
time costs.
4.5 Blind Black-box Sponge Examples and Hardware Transferability on NLP Tasks
In this section we turn to the question of transferability across hardware and different models in a
blind black-box manner. Table 3 shows the results across different models, languages and hardware
platforms. We observe a significant increase in energy and time in comparison to natural samples.
However, the blind black-box attacks fail to achieve the same level of energy or latency degradation
when taking the white-box case as a baseline.
5 Defending against Sponge Examples
Sponge examples can be found by adversaries with limited knowledge and capabilities, making
the threat vector realistic. We propose a simple defense to preserve the availability of hardware
accelerators in the presence of sponge examples. In Table 1, we observe that there exists a large
energy gap between natural examples and random or sponge examples. We propose that prior to the
deployment of a model, natural examples get profiled to measure the time or energy cost of inference.
The defender can then fix a cut-off threshold. This way, the maximum consumption of energy per
inference run is controlled and sponge examples will have a bounded impact on availability.
This deals with the case where the threat model is battery drainage. Where the threat is a jamming
attack on real-time performance, as for example with the vision system of an autonomous vehicle or
a missile targeting system driven by cognitive radar, the system will need to be designed for worst-
case performance, and if need be a fallback driving or targeting mechanism should be provided.
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6 Conclusion
We introduced energy-latency attacks, which equip an adversary to increase the latency and energy
consumption of ML systems thus jeopardizing their availability. Our attacks are effective against
deep neural networks in a spectrum of threat models that realistically capture current deployments
of ML, whether as a service or on edge devices. They can be mounted by adversaries whose access
varies from total access to none at all. Our work demonstrates the need for careful worst-case
analysis of the latency and energy consumption of computational systems that use deep learning
mechanisms.
Broader Impact: Carbon emission and Machine Learning
Most of the prior research on the carbon footprint of machine learning focuses on the energy required
to train large neural network models and its contribution to carbon emissions [53, 54, 55]. This
work shows that we need to study carbon emissions at small scales as well as large. As with side-
channel attacks on cryptographic systems, the fine-grained energy consumption of neural networks
is a function of the inputs processed. In this case, the main consequence is not leakage of confidential
information but a denial of service attack.
First, sponge examples can aim to drain a device’s batteries; the operations and memory accesses
in inference account for around a third of the work done during a complete backpropagation step
(i.e. forward-backward pass), but inference happens at a much higher frequency and scale compared
to training once a model is deployed. Our research characterizes the worst-case energy consumption
of inference. This is particularly pronounced with natural language processing tasks, where the
worst case can take over 100 times the time and energy of the average case.
Second, the sponge examples found by our attacks can be used in a targeted way to cause an em-
bedded system to fall short of its performance goal. In the case of a machine-vision system in an
autonomous vehicle, this might enable an attacker to crash the vehicle; in the case of a missile guided
by a neural network target tracker, a sponge example countermeasure might break the tracking lock.
Adversarial worst-case performance must, in such applications, be tested carefully by system engi-
neers.
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Appendices
A Definitions
Energy E is the total consumed static power Pstatic and dynamic power Pdynamic for an interval of
time t.
E = (Pstatic + Pdynamic)× t
Static power refers to the consumption of the circuitry when it is in idle state [56]. There exist
multiple models to estimate the static energy consumption depending on the technology [56, 57, 58].
In this paper we follow a coarse-grained approach to energy estimation.
Pstatic =
∑
Ileakage × Vcore =
∑
Is × (e
qVd
kT − 1)× Vcore (2)
where Is is the reverse saturation current; Vd is the diode voltage; k is the Boltzmann’s constant; q
is the electronic charge; T is temperature and Vcore is the supply voltage.
Dynamic power refers to consumption from (dis)charging of the said circuitry [57].
Pdynamic = α× C × V
2
d × f (3)
Here, α refers to the activity factor i.e. components that are currently consuming power; Vd is the
source voltage; C is the capacitance; and f is the clock frequency.
Ultimately an attacker attempts to solve an optimisation problem
max
θ
E, where E =
(
[
∑
Is × (e
qVd
kT − 1)× Vcore] + [α× C × V
2
d × f ]
)
× t (4)
For all parameters considered in the equation, only very few could be affected by the adversary
described in Section 3.1. In particular, there are only four parameters that an attack might manipulate:
T , α, f and t. Although frequency and temperature cannot be controlled directly, they are affected
through optimisations performed by the computing hardware. As we assume a single GPU, CPU or
ASIC, we focus on the activity ratio α, the time t and the switching power from flipping the state
of transistors. The execution time t and activity ratio α link tightly to the number of operations
and memory accesses performed. In the temporal dimension, attackers might trigger unnecessary
passes of a compute-intensive block; in the spatial domain, attackers can turn sparse operations to
dense ones. These temporal and spatial attack opportunities can significantly increase the number of
memory and arithmetic operations and thus create an increase in α and t to maximise energy usage.
B Parameter Choices
We have thoroughly evaluated different parameter choices for the Sponge attack and found that a
small pool size and a relatively short number of GA iterations could be sufficient for a large number
of tasks.
Figure 2 shows the performance of Sponge samples on the RoBERTa model for the Winograd
Schema Challenge (WSC) with different pool sizes and varying input sequence length. The hori-
zontal axis shows the number of GA iterations. In terms of pool size of the GA, although there is an
increase in performance for larger pool sizes, the increase is marginal. In addition, smaller pool sizes
significantly reduce the runtime for the attack. From the hardware perspective, using a large pool
size might trigger GPUs to throttle, so that the runtime will be further increased. For the number of
GA iterations, we observed that consistently for smaller input sequences, the convergence is faster.
This is mainly because the complexity of the search is less. In practice, we found almost all input se-
quence lengths we tested plateau within 100 GA iterations; even going to over 1000 iterations gives
only a small increase in performance. For these reasons, for the experiments presented below we
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Figure 2: GA performance with WSC task from GLUE Benchmark. Words of size 29 are evaluated
with pool sizes of 100, 300, 500, 700 and 900.
report the results of the attack with a pool size of 100 for GLUE and Computer Vision benchmarks,
and 1000 for translation tasks. We use 100 GA iterations for all benchmarks tested.
C Language and Vision Models Results
Table 1 and Table 2 show full sets of Sponge attacks running on NLP and CV tasks. It can be seen
that the attacker can exploit the algorithmic complexity of NLP models and cause massive increases
in both energy consumption and latency. It is clear that the increase is non-uniform across models,
and we hypothesize that this is connected to the task detail and richness of the dictionaries we used.
For CV tasks, we can also observe that the attacker is capable of constructing samples that result
in an increased internal data density. We observe that, for some network architectures, the effect is
more prominent. Interestingly, we find that the majority of improvement comes not from density-
side after ReLU, but rather from the propagation of non-zero values as this increases the number of
DRAM accesses. For example, on mobilenet, decrease in sparsity leads to at least 7% degradation
on ASIC.
D Domain Specific Optimisations for Sponge
In Section 3.3 we outlined the genetic algorithm we used to find Sponge samples.
Despite the common structure, we relied heavily on domain-specific optimisations. In this section,
we explain the reasoning behind them.
First, for NLP tasks, the greatest impact on performance was acquired from exploiting the encoding
schemes used by different tasks. While the genetic algorithm was fast to pick up, it struggled with
efficiency around the mid-point, where the parents were concatenated. For example, when trying
to break down individual words to more tokens, we observed the GA inserting backslashes into
the samples. When concatenated, we saw cases where two non-backslashes followed each other,
meaning the GA was losing on a couple of characters. As a solution, we probabilistically flipped the
halves and saw a slight improvement.
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Input size NVMLgpu Naturalasic Randomasic EEE Meanasic EEE Top 10%asic Energygpu Timegpu
SuperGLUE Benchmark with [37]
CoLA
15 5829.32 4.30 69.72 83.92 87.11 ×20.25 ×1.23
30 9388.40 4.30 138.07 164.07 169.91 ×39.51 ×1.48
50 14030.60 4.30 227.48 267.60 275.27 ×64.01 ×2.50
70 17369.33 4.30 318.87 370.34 379.76 ×88.30 ×2.66
100 22698.87 4.30 452.49 518.19 530.80 ×123.42 ×3.82
MNLI
15 6126.65 12.88 73.47 86.97 89.96 ×6.98 ×1.32
30 9631.68 17.66 142.63 168.96 174.34 ×9.87 ×2.03
50 13777.36 23.28 232.22 270.95 278.85 ×11.98 ×2.22
70 17696.38 28.52 321.63 370.80 381.21 ×13.37 ×2.55
100 22952.14 34.47 456.11 518.89 531.40 ×15.42 ×3.16
WSC
15 27876.53 14.48 523.28 1300.19 2152.67 ×148.62 ×9.83
30 82822.58 34.94 1882.63 3927.63 5348.06 ×153.08 ×19.25
40 126009.10 47.34 3151.23 6438.32 9345.28 ×197.42 ×35.93
70 324814.61 115.17 8444.53 15632.59 20191.31 ×175.32 ×54.18
100 662811.96 194.89 16754.13 25367.30 30692.95 ×157.49 ×69.83
WMT14/16 with [41]
En→Fr
10 23497.33 15.07 40.47 55.36 90.38 ×6.00 ×5.83
30 59597.32 31.87 109.80 118.47 141.27 ×4.43 ×4.45
50 93731.34 48.54 166.13 249.89 569.85 ×11.74 ×13.51
En→De 15 18133.66 18.19 35.80 242.39 542.35 ×29.82 ×32.86
Table 4: Energy is reported in milli joules. All numbers are simulated, except for NVML, which is
sampled directly from the GPU. GA was ran for 100 epochs with a pool size of 100.
For CV tasks, we observed that random samples were always classified as belonging to the same
class. Furthermore, random samples had very low internal density. We hypothesize that this has to
do with the fact that on random samples there are very few class features, as opposed to what is ob-
served in natural samples. As the GA improvement largely depends on randomness, that meant that
we often observed that after merging two highly dense parents, uniform randomness across all pixels
was decreasing sparsity to the level of random samples. In other words, uniform randomness was di-
luting class features. In order to counter this phenomenon, instead of applying uniform randomness
across all pixel values, we resorted to diluting only 1% of them. That led to a bigger improvement
of the whole population pool. Furthermore, after observing that the density is class-dependent, it
became apparent that in order to preserve diversity in the pool it was important to keep samples from
multiple classes. For this, we tried to ensure that at least 20 different classes were preserved in the
pool.
We attempted to use domain knowledge and tried adding operations like rotation, transposition and
re-scaling into the mutation process, yet we found that these did not lead to significant improve-
ments.
E Measuring impact in practice
Although we have presented in Section 4.3 that Sponge attacks cause the ASIC energy consumption
to rise for computer vision tasks, it is still unclear what this translates to the real life.
If one were to directly measure the CPU or GPU load per adversarial sample, interpreting it would
be hard, especially when one talks about the energy cost improvements in the order of around 5%
for ResNet18 and 3% as for DenseNet101. As is mentioned in Appendix A the main energy costs
include the frequency of switching activities, voltage and clock frequency. Due to the heat impact
from voltage and clock frequency, a large number of different optimisations are deployed by the
hardware. Here, the optimisations try to balance multiple objectives – they try to be as performant
as they can, whilst being as energy efficient as possible and also maintain reliability. Modern CPUs
and GPUs have a number of performance modes between which the hardware can switch. For
example, official Nvidia documentation lists 15 different performance modes.
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Time Simulated Absolute ration Density
ImageNet
ResNet-18
Sponge LBFGSB 0.006 53.359 0.899 0.896
Sponge 0.006 51.816 0.873 0.869
Natural 0.007 51.748 0.871 0.869
Random 0.006 49.685 0.837 0.834
ResNet-50
Sponge LBFGSB 0.011 164.727 0.863 0.885
Sponge 0.016 160.887 0.843 0.868
Natural 0.017 160.562 0.842 0.867
Random 0.017 155.820 0.817 0.845
ResNet-101
Sponge LBFGSB 0.021 258.526 0.857 0.873
Sponge 0.024 254.182 0.842 0.861
Natural 0.027 253.042 0.839 0.857
Random 0.025 249.027 0.825 0.846
DenseNet-121
Sponge LBFGSB 0.033 152.595 0.783 0.826
Sponge 0.029 149.564 0.767 0.814
Natural 0.033 147.227 0.755 0.804
Random 0.030 144.365 0.741 0.792
DenseNet-161
Sponge LBFGSB 0.040 288.427 0.726 0.764
Sponge 0.044 287.153 0.723 0.761
Natural 0.045 282.273 0.711 0.751
Random 0.044 279.270 0.703 0.744
DenseNet-201
Sponge LBFGSB 0.048 237.745 0.756 0.788
Sponge 0.046 239.845 0.763 0.794
Natural 0.049 234.948 0.747 0.781
Random 0.046 233.700 0.743 0.777
GoogleNet
Sponge LBFGSB 0.018 47.454 0.862 0.953
Sponge 0.015 46.088 0.837 0.951
Natural 0.016 45.964 0.835 0.955
Random 0.015 44.164 0.802 0.938
MobileNet v2
Sponge LBFGSB 0.011 87.511 0.844 0.890
Sponge 0.010 84.513 0.815 0.868
Natural 0.011 85.075 0.821 0.873
Random 0.011 80.805 0.779 0.844
Table 5: Energy is reported in milli joules. All numbers are simulated, except for NVML, which is
sampled directly from the GPU. GA was ran for 100 epochs with a pool size of 100.
Figure 3 shows measurements taken during the Sponge GA attack running against ResNet-18. The
x-axis shows the number of epochs, with each epoch the internal density is increasing from 0.75%
to 0.8%. In (a), the right y-axis shows mean energy readings per sample, whereas left y-axis shows
mean power readings per-sample. In (b) the left y-axis shows mean latency values per-sample.
The amount of power consumed is strongly correlated to the amount of time taken by each sample.
When the GPU speeds up, it consumes more energy but requires less time, but the rise in temper-
ature causes the hardware then to go to a more conservative mode to cool down. We observe this
heating and cooling cycle with all tasks running on GPUs, making it hard to measure the absolute
performance and the attack impact.
We can however measure the performance statistically. First, we turn to a question of
Can we detect energy differences between Natural, Random and sponge samples?
To investigate the relationship between the samples we use Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon U test (U-
test), a nonparametric test for difference between distributions. With three classes of samples, we
need three pairwise comparisons. For each one, the null hypothesis that the distributions of energy
consumed by the samples are identical. The complement hypothesis is that of a difference between
distributions.
The U-test is based on three main assumptions:
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Figure 3: ResNet-18 solving ImageNet-2017 without any rate limiting with increasing internal den-
sity.
• Independence between samples;
• The dependent variable is at least ordinal;
• The samples are random.
The first assumption is fulfilled since no sample belongs to more than one category i.e. natural,
random and sponge. The second assumption is satisfied by the fact that both time and energy are
cardinal variables. The third assumption, however, is harder to satisfy.
The cause of this lies in the closed nature of hardware optimisations: although some of the tech-
niques are known, the exact parameters are unknown. Furthermore, it is hard to achieve same state
of the hardware even through power cycling. As was mentioned in Appendix A temperature affects
energy directly, and it is hard to make sure that the hardware always comes back to the same state.
To minimise temperature effects we apply the load of natural, attack and random samples and wait
until the temperature stabilises. That takes approximately 30000 samples. The order of the samples
is random, and at this point it can be assumed that all of the data and instruction caches are filled.
Finally, because the samples are randomly shuffled, all of the predictive optimisations will work
with the same probability for each of the classes.
For these reasons, we believe it is safe to assume that the samples themselves are random in that
the effect of hardware optimisations is random, so that the last assumption of Mann-Whitney test is
fulfilled.
Using Mann-Whitney U test we can pairwise compare the natural, random and sponge samples.
The test indicates that the three types of samples generate energy consumption distributions which
are statistically different (one-sided test, p-value=0.000) for mobilenet executed on a CPU. On a
practical level, the amount of energy consumed by sponge samples is 1.5% higher on a CPU and
>7% on ASIC. We could not evaluate the energy recordings on a GPU, as the standard deviation was
in excess of 15% which worsened as temperature increased.
Figure 4 shows the confidence of Mann-Whitney test with mobilenet measured on the CPU as a
function of the number of observations. The number of observations is on the x-axis, and the p-value
on the y-axis. As it can be seen, in a stable environment i.e. the temperature has stabilised, after
about 100 observations per class the differences become statistically significant at any reasonable
confidence level. A similar trend is observed for unstable temperature environment, but around three
times more data is required. That means that in practice, about 100–300 observations per class are
sufficient to differentiate between classes with high confidence.
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Figure 4: Mann-Whitney test on CPU measured Mobilenet execution. Number of observations is
shown on x-axis and p-value on the y-axis.
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Figure 5: Sponge example density transanferability.
Figure 5 shows the density difference of transferred sponge samples. As it can be clearly seen, for
all but one – i.e. mobilenet – network, the sponge samples have increased the internal data density
despite not having any knowledge of what natural samples look like. All of the sponge samples
outperformed random noise, suggesting that sponge samples target specific features of the data set
and can be applied in a blind Black-box fashion.
G Per class density transfer
Figure 6 shows the density of natural samples from ImageNet dataset. It can be clearly seen that
there are per-class similarities between data densities of natural samples. These are particularly
pronounced within resnet and densenet architectures hinting that similar architectures learn similar
class-data representations. Finally the third graph subgraph in Figure 6.c shows the summed per-
class densities across all of the tested networks. There are classes that are consistently densely
represented across all the tested networks.
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Figure 6: Per-class density of natural samples from the ImageNet validation dataset.
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Figure 7: Per-class mean density of samples evaluated on ResNet18 and DenseNet161. The natural
samples are from the validation set and are compared to 50 000 randomly generated samples and
1000 Sponge GA samples. The scales are normalised to form a probability density.
H Understanding Sponge and sponge performance
To better understand the results, we present Figure 7 which shows per-class density distributions of
natural, random and Sponge samples. There are 50000 random and natural samples respectively and
1000 Sponge samples, with the bars normalised to form a probability density.
The first thing that becomes apparent is that randomly generated samples on CV models cost signifi-
cantly less energy because many activations are not activated. On average, random samples result in
a sparser computation – around 4% more sparse for ResNet18 – and our simulator costs for natural
samples are around 4 − 7% higher than the costs of random samples. Second, a surprising finding
is that the most and least sparse samples are clustered in a handful of classes. In other words, cer-
tain classes have inputs that are more expensive than others in terms of energy. For ResNet-18, the
most sparse classes are ‘wing’ and ‘spotlight’ while the least sparse are ‘greenhouse’ and ‘howler
monkey’. We observe a similar effect for larger ResNet variants and also DenseNets, although the
energy gap is smaller on DenseNets. Interestingly, we see that energy expensive classes are con-
sistent across different architectures, and we further demonstrate this class-wise transferability in
Appendix G. Ultimately, the implications of this phenomenon are that it is possible to burn energy
or slow a system without much preparation, by simply bombarding the model with natural samples
from energy-consuming classes. Finally, we see that the Sponge samples are improving the popula-
tion performance and tend to outperform natural sample. We observe that it is easier for Sponge to
outperform all natural samples for DensNets of different size, yet it struggles to outperform all of
the ResNets. We further measure the energy performance statistically in Appendix E.
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